Since the mid-seventies, supervaluationism has been supported because of its capacity to give a conservative semantics for vague predicates and to avoid the so-called sorites paradox.
which I present here, is introduced to interpret the elusiveness positively from an information-theoretic point of view. Thus the aim of the paper is to present a dynamic semantics for vague predicates as a revised version of supervaluationism.
Characteristics of Vague Predicates
Vague predicates are ubiquitous in natural languages. Thus vagueness should be paid more attention for any attempt to provide semantics for natural languages.
Here I shall argue three characteristics of vague predicates to rehearse the following sections.
The first and essential characteristic is that vague predicates have borderline cases. In the case of 'heap', a grain of sand cannot make a heap whereas one million sands can. Concerning intermediate numbers of sands, however, there are border line cases in which we cannot judge whether definitely they make a heap or definitely not. Thus vague predicates have three types of cases, namely 'positive', ' negative', and 'indeterminate' cases, which are neither positive nor negative.
The second and local characteristic is that vague predicates have a principle of tolerance. This feature of vague predicates is emphasized by Dummett [2] and Wright [12] . They introduce the notion of 'observational predicates' in order to explain it. They are predicates concerning sense data; they predicate objects based on a subject's impressions caused by her direct observations of them. Take 'red' as an example in the following.1
(1) Thought Experiment on Color Spectrum 1 Condition: Suppose there is a large screen where the following color spectrum is projected, that is, the leftmost portion of it is definitely red, the rightmost one is definitely orange, and between them is a uniform and gradual transi-tion from one to another. The screen is divided by lots of squares, each of which has its proper hue and is too small to discriminate between its adjacent ones by our casual observations. Let us call such a sequence of objects ' sorites sequence' henceforth. In addition, all but one square is covered at any time. Experiment: Suppose a normal subject who is standing in front of the screen has to answer definitely to an experimenter's questions asking what color she sees. First the experimenter points the leftmost square, and then asks its color to the subject. Then, hiding the square and showing its immediate right one, the experimenter asks the same question. Thereafter, the same step and question continue. The last and global characteristic is that vague predicates have the property that can be stated as a principle of anchors. This feature is examined in Kamp [7] . In the previous experiment there is a trick that plays a role of focusing on the locality of vague predicates (i.e., that the subject is able to see only one square in the screen for being covered on the whole). Let us consider a modified experiment. Condition: Same as (1) except the screen's not being covered at all. Experiment: Suppose a normal subject who is standing in front of the uncover ed screen has to answer definitely to the experimenter's questions asking what color she sees. First the experimenter points the leftmost square and then asks about its color to the subject. Then, the experimenter asks the same question In this case, unlike in (1), a global aspect of vague predicates is considered as well. That is, the subject is aware in advance that the screen projects its transition from red to orange. Then, the result would be as follows. At first the subject answers that it is red without any hesitation, but she starts hesitating to answer. Then at some squares such answers would be returned as, "I don't know how to answer, but I dare say that it's red." or "It seems more orangey, but it's red." Finally, a reply would be returned definitely at a square such as, "It's no longer red, but orange".
The difference in results between (1) and (3) comes from that between local and global traits. Thus, on the one hand, in (1) there is a trick that makes only the principle of tolerance work, and the unacceptable conclusion follows. On the other hand, in (3) both characteristics work well, and the global one acts as a brake (or anchor) on unlimited applications to predication through the local one. Notice that when both have the same power, we are to be involved in a kind of paradox. Thus, the following principle holds globally. ( 
4) Principle of Anchors2
For any vague predicate, it has both extensions that is definitely true and is definitely false.
Moreover, the principle would be convinced easily when the experiment is started with the rightmost square and an unnatural question 'Is this non-red?'.
The Sorites Paradox
As the previous section implies, vague predicates seem to contain a paradox because of their tolerance. Let us take a vague predicate 'heap' for instance. It is obviously true that a single grain of sand cannot make a heap. Now, it is also true due to the principle of tolerance that for an arbitrary number of sands, if a certain number of sands cannot make a heap, then adding just one grain of sand to it cannot make a heap yet. However these premises entail that even a sufficiently large number of sands cannot make a heap, which is absurd since it is clearly against our intuition and common sense. This is the sorites paradox. The argument is made by a mathematical induction or sufficiently many applications of modus ponens (I call the former 'inductive version' and the latter 'chain version'). Similar arguments are easily applied to other vague predicates using a relevant sorites sequence; their general schema is as follows (let x1 be the first object of the sorites sequence relevant Akihiro YOSHIMITSU Vol. 12 to F and xn be the object late enough to apply the principle of anchors). According to the previous section, there are three ways to handle the sorites paradox. Here I shall discuss only supervaluationism because it is broadly consid ered as the better theory than the others and directly concerned with my own theory. 4 Supervaluationism is a semantical framework that was formalized first by B. C. van Fraassen in the sixties, and then by Fine [3: 1975] applied to an analysis of vagueness. Introducing the concept of 'super-truth' (and 'super-falsity'), it solves the paradox treating with borderline cases as well as holding all theorems of classical logic, so that it is often said to be a conservative but elusive framework.
A rejection of premise B (or premises Bi) means that we have to draw a precise boundary somewhere between positive and negative extensions, whereas vague predicates have their borderline cases. Therefore supervaluationism proposes such a compromise that borderline cases are a sort of semantical indeterminacy so that a precise boundary would be drawn at one place under a certain situation and at another place under another situation within limits of our admissions to draw them. Such admissible drawings of boundaries are called 'admissible specifications'. Then, the domains of being definitely true and being definitely false are regarded as those lacking any admissible specification, whereas borderline cases as those having some admissible specifications. Hence supervaluationism supposes three semantic values (i.e., truth, falsity and indeterminacy or 'truth-gaps' in an exact sense), and then gives the following definitions. (10) Truth A framework I shall introduce here is a revised version of supervaluationism. The framework is first suggested in Lewis [8: 1979] and formalized in Kamp [7: 1981] , then followed up and developed in Pinkal [9: 1985] without a uniform name for it through their works.6 Moreover, a semantics which shares the basic idea with it has been developed independently and widely accepted within other areas of semantics (such as anaphora and presupposition) since the nineties. Currently, the semantics is termed dynamic semantics; my framework would be a version of dynamic semantics. Thus, the originality and contribution of my paper consist in rewriting and reinterpreting Pinkal's framework in terms of dynamic semantics (though concerning some of terminology I follow Pinkal due to the aptness (e. g., context)). I also present it as a revised version of supervaluationism, which is free from the elusiveness discussed earlier. At first, I shall give the main idea of dynamic semantics in general and a brief sketch of its application to vague predi cates, and then its formalization. 7 A logical semantics since Frege has had a slogan that meaning of sentence equals its truth condition ( [5] p. 179). It is a kind of static semantics that regards a sentence as a unit of meaning and describes a direct relation between world and language. While such a static semantics has advantages when applied to purely formal systems like mathematics, it has disadvantages as semantics for natural languages. The fact has been well known since the sixties, and many attempts have been made to overcome it. H. Kamp and I. Heim overcame the binding indepen dently in the early eighties at last (see [5] pp. 180f in detail). Their common idea was that basic units of semantic interpretation are not sentences but discourses. Furthermore, discourses are dynamic in the sense that they are altered through utterances one after another. Then dynamic semantics, which was presented in the early nineties, has taken its drastic course along their idea and appealed to interpre tation processes of discourse for dynamics of semantic interpretations. Thus it regards discourses to be series of processes in which content of the information (it is called information state) is successively updated, with possibilities of interpretations being narrowed down by utterances. In the dynamic view, a concept of meaning is expressed as follows: "[T] he meaning of a sentence is the change that an utterance of it brings about, and the meanings of non-sentential expressions consist in their contributions to this change" ( [5] p. 181). Therefore, its slogan is "meaning is information change potential" ( [5] p. 182) and the idea is applied to a concept of entailment as follows ([5] I describe an information state in brief. It is regarded as "a set of possibilities, consisting of alternatives that are open to the information" ( [5] p. 183). There are two kinds of information state. One is information about the world and the other is discourse information. The former is information about the world literally. We can get this type of information in various ways, and such a kind of information would be partial. The latter is information concerning discourse where we can exchange verbal information (its typical example is a relation of anaphora across sentence). However, the latter kind of information is not of our current interest, and I shall focus on the former hereafter (see [5] pp. 183ff for these two kinds of information in detail).
Now the interpretation process is explained as follows. A speaker begins her own partial information states at earlier situations in a discourse. Then, partici pants' utterances in the discourse make her information states update and subse quent utterances make her updated ones updated further, and then the process is repeated. In this process, the more content of information the speaker has, the more specific information about the world becomes by excluding the possibilities and narrowing the interpretations. However information states are not always updated in a way that the interpretations are specified reasonably. Notice that an utterance sometimes brings about an absurd state that no longer has any possibility about the world, and then the interpretation process halts. A typical example is a flow of discourse in which a rational speaker utters, "It may rain" after her utterance, "It isn't raining".
Next I sketch how dynamic semantics deals with vagueness. It treats vague ness in such a way that from an information-theoretic point of view evades the paradox exploiting the three characteristics of vague predicates. The main idea is as follows. At first we assume that information states that play a role of carrying information in a discourse using vague predicates are sets of contexts that assign truth-values to sets of sentences. Updating the states with information concerning the vague predicate means that some imprecise contexts (i.e., contexts including indeterminate truth-values) are excluded through it. Then, a solution of the paradox is explained as follows. Let us think of a discourse in the color spectrum experiments earlier (regardless of (1) or (3) here), where a speaker corresponds to a subject, a participant in the discourse does to an experimenter, and sources of information for update do to 'judgment by subject's vision' and 'utterances to Then 'context', termed 'possibilities' in the standard dynamic semantics, is defined as follows.
Def. 3 Context
Let u (structure in LV) and g (assignment to the structure) be disjoint and non-empty. Then, a context c based on u and g is just an ordered pair [u, g].
Next we define 'information state' in LV below.
Def. 4 Information State
Let c be a context based on u and g. Then, information state s is just a set of contexts c.
As to the definitions of context and information state in LV we define two orderings.
They are precisification relations among information on vague predi cates. Specifically, we shall consider 'determination of indeterminate sentences in contexts' (or precisification of contexts, cf. Def. 5.1) and 'elimination of contexts by precisifications' (or precisification of information states, of. Def. 5.2), which are defined below. This suggests that the interpretation process in dynamic semantics for LV always leads to a new information state that precisifies the old one or the same state as the old one. The semantics with this feature is called 'update semantics'. Now we re-state the initial state (or model) and the state of total information based on the structure u for their importance. An initial state s1 based on the structure u is just a non-empty information state that is formed by updating a state of ignorance via the principle of anchors.
(13) State of Total Information A state of total information based on the structure u is just an information state where any further precisification leads to an absurd state. 
Dynamic Semantics: Its Significance and Further Question
In this section, I shall point out the significance of dynamic semantics for vague predicates. Moreover, I shall raise a further question on it, to which I give a tentative answer.
First important thing to note about dynamic semantics is that it presents not only a theory of meaning but that of action in a formal aspect. Wright argues in [12, 13] that it is not possible to give any formal semantics for vague predicates, and then he tries to provide a pragmatic account of them instead. L. C. Burns also gives in [1] an informal pragmatic account of vague predicates, but she suspects that it is impossible to offer any formal treatment for them (see [1] p. 194). However, dynamic semantics gets pragmatics within its scope through the introduc tion of dynamic entailment. A typical example is that in the model (15) the speaker would take an action of eschewing utterance that Rf due to a violation of consis tency in the discourse. Also remember the main idea of dynamic semantics. In dynamic semantics, utterances are considered to have the potential to change the flow of discourse, hence from the beginning dynamic semantics in general tries to bring pragmatics into formal semantics and it is the very reason why it is called ' dynamic'. Interestingly, the two authors above, who investigate pragmatics for vague predicates, share the same idea to avoid the paradox, that is, to weaken the principle of tolerance, then defend the existence of clear but somewhat whimsical boundaries under various contexts. Dynamic semantics also shares the same idea, so considering that fact, it seems to give a formal pragmatics for them as far as possible. that vague predicates lack any kind of sharp boundary from the outset.11 She would argue that the principle of anchors is so robust and strong that it cannot fit our natural intuition about the genuine vagueness. If it is a natural concept of vagueness, it is obvious that the framework cannot explain this kind of vagueness at all. Dynamic semantics adheres to first-order vagueness in the sense that there are two sharp boundaries to classify the extensions. Faced with the trouble, we would have three alternatives left. The first one is to adjust dynamic semantics to it exploiting a precise concept of higher-order vagueness. The second one is to adjust dynamic semantics to it exploiting a concept of a vague meta-language. The last one is to defend such a first-order vagueness in a positive way. I would like to take the last one willingly, but there is no space for discussing the issue, so I shall do on another opportunity.
Notes
